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Abstract
We study theoretically and quantitatively how official lending regimes affect a gov-
ernment’s decision to raise saving as opposed to defaulting, and its implication for
sovereign bond pricing by investors. We reconsider debt sustainability in the face of
both output and rollover risk under two types of institutional bailouts: one based on
long-maturity, low-spread loans similar to the ones offered by the euro area official
lenders; the other, on shorter maturity and high-spread loans, close to the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund standards. We show that official lending regimes raise the stock
of safe debt and facilitate consumption smoothing through debt reduction. However,
to the extent that bailouts translates into higher future debt stocks and countercyclical
deficits in persistent recessions, they also have countervailing effects on sustainability.
Quantitatively, the model is able to replicate Portuguese debt and spread dynamics in
the years of the bailout after 2011. We show that, depending on the composition of
debt by maturity and official lending, sustainable debt levels can vary between 50% of
GDP and 180% of GDP depending on the state of the economy and the conditions for
market access. Longer maturities have a stronger effect on sustainability than lower
spreads.
Keywords: Sovereign debt, default, maturity, spread, rollover, bailout
1 Introduction
In response to the sovereign debt crises that shook the euro area in the aftermath of the
Great Recession, the governments of Cyprus, Greece, Ireland and Portugal received funds
from both the International Monetary Fund and newly created European institutions: the
European Financial Stability Facility at first, then the European Stability Mechanism (ESM).
The scale and modalities of the official assistance re-ignited the long-standing debate on debt
sustainability and the design of international financial rescues (see Conesa and Kehoe (2014);
Tirole (2015); D’Erasmo et al. (2016); Collard et al. (2015); Gourinchas and Martin (2017);
Roch and Uhlig (2018) among others).
The euro area crisis indeed resulted in a large-scale experiment with international bailouts,
creating opportunities for reconsidering critical and understudied issues in the providing in-
ternational financial assistance. One of the most striking features of the country programs
in the euro area is that the terms of official loans deviated significantly from consolidated
international practices. Relative to International Monetary Fund standards, ESM loans were
issued with much longer maturities (15/22 years versus 7 years), lower interest rates (200-300
basis points, vs, 300-400 basis points) and larger size (far exceeding the amount permissible
under IMF rules)——for a detailed account of the evolution of official lending in Europe, see
Corsetti et al. (2017).
Motivated by this evidence, this paper studies the effects of varying the terms of official
lending on debt sustainability, market access conditions, and a country’s vulnerability to
crises. Our point of departure is the notion that official loans affect a government’s incentives
to issue, repay and default on debt, hence they matter for how much debt a country can
sustain just like tax capacity, spending and inflation. Yet, the extent to which official loans
impinge on a government fiscal decision may differ, depending on their maturity, spreads and
size, raising questions concerning the underlying economic mechanisms, their quantitative
relevance and potential welfare-relevant trade-offs.
To investigate these issues, we introduce official lending institutions in an otherwise
standard model of debt default, after Conesa and Kehoe (2017). We use this framework to
gain analytical insight on how official lending may restore debt sustainability, i.e. induce
a government to choose higher surpluses over default, in an economic environment with
both non-fundamental (rollover) risk in the debt market, and fundamental (output) risk. In
a quantitative exercise, we show how official lending may have contributed to address the
sovereign risk crisis in Portugal in 2011. Bases on this exercise, we carry out counter-factual
exercises to explore the sensitivity of our results to changing maturity versus prices of loans.
Our main results are as follows. First, we show that the availability of official bailout funds
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raises the threshold below which debt is default free, and helps high-debt countries facing
rollover and fundamental risk to smooth consumption in the transition from the ‘crisis’ to the
‘safe zone.’ However, higher levels of safe debt translates into lower long-run consumption
and thus welfare. Because of these opposing effects, the effects of official lending on debt
sustainability may be non linear. Larger bailout may actually lower the debt threshold at
which the government chooses default when in the crisis zone.
Second, quantitatively, we show that the model is able to replicate the dynamic evolu-
tion of debt and spreads in Portugal around the access of this country to the ESM program.
In our exercises, the stock of debt and spreads move in opposite directions as the country
substitutes official for market lending—the same pattern as in the data (although, relative
to the evidence, our model under-predicts debt growth). In short, by containing borrowing
costs and reducing the period-by-period financing need of the government, official finan-
cial programs of the kind Portugal received during the crisis reduced the need for strong
deleveraging during a deep recession.
Third, through counterfactuals based on the parameters of IMF and ESM lending, we find
that reducing the period-by-period flow payments through lengthening maturities appears
to have much stronger effects on sustainability, than reducing spreads. The counterfactual
exercises also suggests that the fundamental trade-offs unveiled by the model—between rais-
ing the threshold below which debt is traded as a safe asset, and reducing the threshold at
which the country defaults when facing rollover risk—is quantitatively relevant.
On methodological grounds, our main contribution consists of a comprehensive model of
official lending addressing both rollover and fundamental sources of sovereign risk. We lay
out our theory in the framework developed by Conesa and Kehoe (2017), where both types
of risk may cause a government to default on its obligations to market creditors. Output risk
reflects the fact that business cycles introduce uncertainty in the government’s ability and
willingness to raise taxes and generate surpluses when in a recession. Rollover risk manifests
itself through market lenders’ beliefs. For a high enough initial level of debt, the country
is in the ‘crisis zone:’ if market lenders coordinate their expectations on the belief that the
government will not repay, this belief becomes self-fulfilling. When in the crisis zone, a
welfare-maximizing government has an incentive to reduce its debt, to obtain a better price
for newly issued debt; however, this incentive may be overturned in a temporary recession,
when the government may prefer to run up debt in anticipation of better times, so as to
smooth consumption over time. This may explain why welfare-maximizing governments
may fail to bring down debt to its safe, no-default zone during a recession, and may prefer
‘gambling’ on the recovery.
Drawing on the empirical evidence and policy practice, in the model the government
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can access official loans that may differ along three key dimensions: interest rates, loan
maturities, and availability/scope of the bailout. The way in which official debt impinges on
debt sustainability vary depending on these terms as well as the source of risk.
Consider first a model environment with rollover risk only. It is quite intuitive that a low
(below market) spread on official loans can help a country keep consumption smooth while
reducing debt to safe level. Similarly, by alleviating the period-by-period payment flows that
the government faces in the event of a confidence crisis, long-term official debt can induce
policymakers to avoid default when they would otherwise opt for it, and keep deleveraging,
for higher initial stocks of public debt. The economics is straightforward. With one period
debt, the period-by-period government financing need coincides with the entire debt stock.
With long debt maturity, what matters for repayment and default decision (and as a result,
sustainability) is the primary deficit and the debt coming due every period.
The main trade-off here is that official assistance also raises the threshold of the safe zone,
such that a country may end up with larger amounts of debt in the long run—implying lower
long-run consumption. Hence generous bailout terms that widen the ‘safe zone’ (and thus
lower long-run consumption) may also lower debt sustainability; i.e., the ‘crisis zone’ shrinks
both from below (a larger safe zone) and from above (a lower debt threshold). However,
the model unveils a subtle, but crucial, consideration: bailouts affect the path chosen by
the government to run debt down to the safe zone. Since, once debt levels are within the
safe zone, the country regains access to market funding with certainty, a faster transition
translates into bail-in of private lenders.
Now bring in output risk. For simplicity, consider the case of two states, high output
(normal times) and low output (recession), and assume that the high state is an absorbing
state (i.e. the economy is not expected to be in a recession again)—so that we can focus on
the effect of official debt during recessionary periods. Without official lending, the maximum
stock of debt that is sustainable during recessions is at the level that would induce the country
to default, should the recession persists. With single-period debt, at the threshold the entire
debt stock must be repaid and the government must pay a premium for newly issued debt
to compensate market lenders for default risk. Official debt contributes to sustainability
along two fronts: first, with longer maturities, countries do not have to repay the amount
owed to creditor in full in each period; second, lower spreads can ease the financing burden
exacerbated by default risk. Those are the key mechanisms by which official lending enhances
sustainability vis-a´-vis output uncertainty.
To be effective in enhancing sustainability, the terms of the bailout have to be such that
the government is indifferent between generating surpluses or default, should the recession
persist. The size and terms of official loans can set generous enough as to induce governments
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to repay even through recessions that are deep and persistent. Nonetheless, theory sheds
light on a key trade-off in doing so (mirroring the one already discussed for the case of
rollover risk only). When the economy is hit by several negative output shocks in succession,
the optimal debt policy is to increase debt to smooth consumption in response to each shock.
But this means that current debt cannot be too high, lest it default in the future.
We take theory to the data combining both environments, so that the model can trace
the implications of official debt for both the endogenous paths of the country’s stock of
liabilities, and repayment and default policies under rollover risk and different realizations
of output uncertainty. We focus on the case of Portugal in 2011-2015. At the height of the
debt crisis, the Portuguese debt to GDP ratio was close to 100%. In the second quarter of
201, borrowing costs were over 700 basis points (bps) higher than the German Bund, with
an average maturity of market debt of six years. Default risk arose from a combination of
fears of serial default across the euro area arguably reflecting both fundamentals and non-
fundamentals factors and the persistence of the ongoing recession (creating output risk in
terms of our model). Portugal received loans from the IMF, and the ESM, different in terms
of spread and maturity.1 In July 2011, the IMF loan had a spread of 300 bps and a maturity
of seven years. By contrast, the euro area loan had virtually no spread and a maturity of
15 years. Shortly after receiving these loans, market spreads on Portuguese bonds started
to come down, to the point that, after a couple of years, Portugal started to repay its IMF
debt by issuing market bonds at better terms.
We use our model to replicate the dynamics of Portuguese debt, starting out from an
initial situation in which debt is well inside the ‘crisis zone,’ and the government only bor-
rows from markets at a high spread. Official loans, up to about 25% of total Portuguese
debt, induce market spreads to fall by the same extent as in the data. The substitution of
risky high-spread, short-maturity market instruments with safer low-spread, long-maturity
instruments allows Portugal to extend the terms of engagement thereby reducing default risk
and the premia that comes with it. We model official loan disbursements staggering them
as in the data: without this, the government will want to substitute market debt for official
debt to a much larger extent.
Having replicated the Portuguese experience, we then use the model as a laboratory
to assess sustainability under different counterfactual policies: we allow the ESM and IMF
either to charge the same rate, or to have the same maturity. One quantitative finding is that
1The Portuguese official loans was funded the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and the
European Financial Stability Mechanism (EFSM), the prequels of the European Stability Mechanism (see
Corsetti et al. (2017)). As the three Funds operate using analogous maturity and pricing terms, and the
ESM is the one with a permanent character, to ease the exposition we refer to the Portuguese European
bail-out as an ESM one.
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differences in maturity matter more than differences in the spread. The largest quantitative
difference in terms of sustainability is observed when the IMF adopts ESM-type maturities.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature, Section 3
review stylized facts of the sovereign crises in the euro area that motivate our study. Section
4 specify the model, and derives analytical insights from a simplified version of it. Section 5
discusses our quantitative exercise. Section 6 concludes.
2 Literature review
Our paper contributes to the vast and rich body of literature on debt sustainability—see
D’Erasmo et al. (2016); Aguiar and Amador (2014) for recent overviews—on at least two
dimensions.2
First, our paper relates to contributions concerned with the role of official sector interven-
tions during crises. Close to our analysis, Arellano et al. (2012) argue that policies that result
in lower interest rates or contain default costs lead governments to run up more debt during
recessions. Conesa and Kehoe (2014) argues that a an official lender of last resort charging
penalty rates would not be able to resolve the euro area crisis. The literature has also specif-
ically focused on catalytic effects of official lending, enhancing the ability of sovereigns to
re-access capital markets.3 Corsetti et al. (2006); Morris and Shin (2006) defines conditions
under which official sector loans can prevent runs on sovereign debt markets. Broner et al.
(2014) models sovereign risk when debt is financed by domestic investors, foreign private
creditors and the official sector, and shows that the official loans can influence private port-
folios, fostering investment and growth. Sandri (2015) focuses on the role of official support
in preventing spillovers from sovereign defaults. Dellas and Niepelt (2016) present a model
of a sovereign that can obtain financing from heterogeneous private lenders and the official
sector, which rationalizes the change in the composition of debt towards official sources as
countries approach default.
2In this literature, a variety of theoretical analyses discuss issues specific to Monetary Unions (Aguiar
et al., 2015, 2016), interaction with monetary policy and inflation (Aguiar et al., 2013) as well as structural
reforms accompanying official sector programs (Muller et al., 2015). While all these issues are at least
indirectly relevant for our analysis, our modeling abstracts from them.
3A number of empirical contributions have focused on this issue. Mina and Martinez-Vazquez (2002);
Saravia (2013), study the relation between sovereign debt maturity and official sector lending. Even more
recently, concerned with the safety of the official sector resources, Reinhart and Trebesch (2016) argue that
in providing longer maturity loans to increasingly stressed sovereigns, the IMF’s role as a lender of last resort
is becoming at risk. Our findings qualify Reinhart and Trebesch (2016) view, as we argue that, adequately
designed, longer official loans can turn an unsustainable situation into a sustainable one.
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Relative to Conesa and Kehoe (2014); Arellano et al. (2012), our specific contribution
consists of modelling official lenders offering different terms on their loans. Also, our interest
is to understand which combination of terms and conditions (among those observed during
the euro area crisis) can enhance the effectiveness of official lending to avoid defaults for a
significant range of economic fundamentals. Our analysis also contributes to improve our
understanding of when and how official loans have a catalytic effect. The impact of official
bailouts on market dynamics critically depend on the lending terms offered to the sovereign.
A second strand of the literature to which we closely relate consists of studies focusing on
the role of debt maturity in enhancing debt sustainability. These contributions calls attention
on the the need to trade off refinancing risks with borrowing costs—a trade-off that is also
center-stage in our analysis. In Cole and Kehoe (2000), lengthening debt maturity reduces
the region where debt is exposed to self-fulling roll-over crisis (see also Aguiar et al. (2016);
Hatchondo and Martinez (2009); Hatchondo et al. (2016); Bai et al. (2015); Mihalache (2016,
2017); Sanchez et al. (2016)). Angeletos (2002) assumes that governments issue long-term
debt to invest in short-term reserves, which help smoothing refinancing needs. In Niepelt
(2014), sovereign risk leads sovereigns to issue short-maturity debt when debt issuance is
high, output is low and cross-default is more likely. Relatedly, Arellano and Ramanarayanan
(2012) and Broner et al. (2013) show that when interest rates rise, maturity shortens. Aguiar
and Amador (2013) show that during a debt crisis it is optimal to switch to short-term
financing and only payback longer debt as it matures. This occurs because when default
risk rises, shorter debt provides better incentives to repay, with positive feedback effects on
borrowing costs. Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2012, 2015) show that to overcome the dilution
problem that makes long-term debt more expensive, sovereigns should include an absolute
priority rule clause on their bonds, giving seniority to earlier lenders.4
Relative to the outstanding literature, we specifically model the ‘tension’ between stock
and flows, showing how the terms of official support can substantially alter the stock of debt
that is sustainable by affecting the cash flow from a country liabilities. A notable result from
our analysis is that, if official creditors are willing to increase the maturity of their exposure,
this may result in an increase in the likelihood of repayment—effectively counteracting debt
dilution as discussed in Arellano and Ramanarayanan (2012); Chatterjee and Eyigungor
(2015); Hatchondo et al. (2016).
4From an empirical perspective, Dias et al. (2014) shows that understanding sovereign risk requires
looking beyond the debt stock variable and into fails to recognize the cash-flows stream associated with such
stock. Relatedly, focusing on the Greek debt stock, Weder di Mauro and Schumaker (2015); Zettelmeyer
et al. (2017) show that different amortization schedules and varying interest rates can make a given stock of
debt look very different. Gabriele et al. (2017) shows the importance of jointly considering debt stock and
refinancing needs to understand borrowing costs, and Bassanetti et al. (2016) show that changes on the debt
stock are an important driver of countries’ capacity to tap financial markets at sustainable rates.
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3 Official Lending in the Euro Area: Stylized Facts
In this section, we provide a a synthetic account of the creation and evolution of euro area
crisis resolution framework, stressing a set of stylized facts that we use to motivate and
discipline our theoretical model. First, we briefly describe the creation this framework and
the key elements of the various programs. Second, we compare and contrast the approach to
official support followed by the IMF and the euro area official lenders, with a focus on their
lending terms. Finally, we provide stylized facts connecting the sovereign debt dynamics in
the euro area to the terms of the official loans provide.
3.1 A Brief Review of Euro Area Official Lending
When in 2009 the Greek authorities admitted they had fiddled with the fiscal deficit figures
and progressively lost market access, the first reaction by European authorities was to de-
mand a significant fiscal adjustment. As this failed and the situation spun out of control,
in March 2010, euro area governments, together with the IMF, agreed to provide financial
assistance, setting up the Greek Loan Facility. The first program consisted of IMF credit
and bilateral loans by other euro area members, for a total of 110 billion euros including a
30 billion euros IMF loan with a 3-years duration and a maturity of five years. Following
IMF practice, the pricing of this loans was a step-wise function of their duration.
When financial stress did spread to Ireland and Portugal, the reaction was to move away
from a bilateral approach and create jointly managed institutions. In June 2010, the Euro-
pean Financial Stability Mechanism (EFSM) and the European Financial Stability Facility
(EFSF) were created. The EFSM was designed as an emergency funding program, man-
aged by the European Commission, with the authority to borrow up to 60 billion euros. In
turn, the EFSF was created as a temporary rescue mechanism to provide financial assistance
within the framework of an adjustment program.
In December 2010, Ireland became the first country to seek assistance of the new institu-
tions. The Irish program provided a financing package of EUR 85 bill, including contributions
from the EFSM (22.5 billion) and EFSF (17.7 billion), and bilateral loans from UK, Sweden
and Denmark (3.8, 0.6 and 0.4 billion euros, respectively). In addition, Ireland signed a 7
years Extended Fund Facility (EFF) agreement with the IMF for 22.5 billion. A few months
later, in April 2011, it was the turn of Portugal to seek support. In this case the financing
of the 78 billion euros program fell on equal parts on the EFSM, EFSF and IMF. The IMF
loan to Portugal was disbursed through the EFF program.
In June 2011, the European authorities agreed to set-up a permanent crisis-management
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institution, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), to become operative by 2014. As the
euro area problems did not abate, the authorities however brought its inauguration forward
in time, in 2012. With 500 billion euros lending capacity supported by 700 billion in capital,
so far the ESM has provided assistance to Spain (July 2012), Cyprus (June 2013) and Greece
(September 2015).
3.2 The Terms of Official Support: IMF-style versus ESM-style
As is well-known, the International Monetary Fund relies on two crisis-resolution credit lines,
the Stand-By Arrangement (SBA) and the Extended Fund Facility (EFF): SBA programs
aim to help members address short-term balance of payments (BoP) problems; EFF programs
instead aim to help countries overcoming medium-term BoP problems. SBA programs are
typically structured over 3 years, with a repayment horizon up to 5 years; EFF programs
are structured over 4 years, with a repayment horizon of up to 10 years. SBA and EFF
programs apply identical borrowing limits and pricing structure. The lending rate is linked
to the special drawing rights (SDR) interest rate. For loans below 187.5 percent of the
member’s quota, the IMF charges 100 bps. This increases to 200 bps for credit above 187.5
percent of the quota. Moreover, to discourage large use of IMF resources, the spread over
the SDR rate is increasing in the time over which credit is outstanding. Additional 100 bps
are charged on loans outstanding over 36 months, provided the loan size remains above 187.5
percent of quota, or if credit remains outstanding in excess of 51 months.5
Relative to the IMF, euro area official lending through the European Stability Mechanism
has a larger concessional element. As described in detailed in a companion paper (Corsetti
et al., 2017), the European framework evolved significantly in time. Initially, euro area
official loans were designed after the IMF blueprint. As new institutions were created, the
terms of official lending changed. Euro area official lenders do not apply fixed loan maturity
standards, and stand ready to extend maturities even beyond three decades. This is in
contrast to IMF practice, where loans horizons are officially limited to 10 years. Similarly,
while IMF spreads are set to grow both with the size of the loan and the repayment period
and can vary between 100 and 300 basis points, euro area official lenders charge a lower
margin between 10 bps for standard loans and 30 bps for loans directed to the banking
system. As a result of its narrower margins, the interest rate paid for euro area official loans
can be significantly lower than that charged for an IMF loan.
5Borrowing limits were modified in 2016. A country has access up to 145 percent of its quota for any
12-month period, and cumulative access up to 435 percent of quota over a program. The IMF can, on a
case-by-case basis, lend above normal limits under the exceptional access policy framework.
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While European institutions and the IMF operated in coordination in each country pro-
gram, the figures just described document a significant divergence in the approach to official
lending. Some implications of these different lending terms for sovereign debt dynamics are
discussed in the following subsection.
3.3 Key Facts
This section presents a set of stylized facts that we will use to discipline our model. We
rely on three main data sources. Financial markets data (sovereign yields) is collected from
Bloomberg. Data on the various official lending vehicles comes from Corsetti et al. (2017).
Finally, quarterly data on debt stocks and refinancing needs are from the European Central
Bank.
We focus on five stylized facts.
Fact 1: Euro area official loans are larger in size, feature longer maturities, and imply
lower borrowing costs that loans from the International Monetary Fund
Table 1 here
As illustrated by Table 1 (and described in detail by Corsetti et al. (2017)), the financial
terms offered by the euro area official lenders in the programs signed by Spain, Cyprus or
Greece with the European Stability Mechanism were substantially more concessional than
IMF standards. In Cyprus and Greece, the original maturity of the loans stood above 20
and 30 years, with 87 bps and 107 bps interest rates, respectively. This contrasts with the 7
year maturity loan Cyprus received from the IMF with an interest rate 20 bps higher, and
the 8-year maturity EFF loan to Greece with a 406 bps interest rate.
Fact 2: Despite the sharp increase in sovereign spreads at the onset of the crisis, public
debt stocks kept increasing. Countries financed further debt accumulation by switching from
market financing to official sources, to a large extent euro area official loans.
Public debt in Europe began to increase in 2008, but it took a while before spreads
reacted negatively, especially in Peripheral countries. Despite a significant worsening in
market access conditions, however public debt accumulation proceeded unabated into the
crisis. Official creditors play a key role in supporting debt expansion.
Figure 1 here
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Figure 1 shows that while in an initial phase governments could finance their increasing
debt by relying on sovereign bond markets, starting in 2010, when market access conditions
significantly worsened, the importance of official loans rose markedly, especially that of euro
area official lending.
Fact 3: With improving market conditions, sovereigns return to bond financing.
Figure 2 compares the evolution of market and official borrowing costs of each country,
over time. As market yields fell significantly (also by virtue of the ECB policies), Ireland
and Portugal started to replace the expensive IMF debt, with cheaper bond issuance.6
Figure 2 here
Concessional loans shifted repayments into the future, containing the risk of roll-over
crises and easing the constraints on further debt accumulation.
Fact 4: Official loans, especially those from the euro area, smoothened the repayment
structure of public debt in program countries.
Figure 3 shows visually the importance of the ESM/EFSF repayment schedule in smooth-
ing debt repayments in the four program countries. The repayment of ESM loans kicks in
only once the loans provided by the IMF have been repaid in full.
Figure 3 here
From a different angle, Figure 4 plots one-year ahead roll-over needs—measured as debt
maturing in the next 12 months as percentage of total debt—against different share of official
debt in total debt. A negative relation between the two is apparent. Official loans by the
ESM significantly smoothed the repayment flows over time, reducing the period-by-period
refinancing needs of crisis countries and their vulnerability to rollover risk (see also Corsetti
et al. 2018).
Figure 4 here
6In January 2014, the cost of the IMF credit to Portugal stood above 4 percent. Given that Portuguese
market rates during 2014 were consistently below the IMF rate, the authorities decided to embark on an early
repayment of the IMF loan, financed issuing marketable securities. Similarly, in the Irish case, following large
IMF disbursements since January 2011, borrowing from the Fund exceeded the 300 percent of the quota in
early 2014. This implied that Ireland faced marginal interest payments of 4.05 percent on its IMF credit. In
contrast, during the summer of 2014, prevailing market interest rates and the rates on the longer maturity
ESM loans were far lower. This created an opportunity for Ireland to lower interest expenses by replacing
the portion of IMF credit subject to surcharges with newly issued cheaper bonds.
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Finally, we discuss evidence regarding the extent to which euro area and IMF official
lending terms affected the interest rate bill from the existing debt stocks (see also ESM,
2017).
Fact 5: Official loans, especially those from the euro area, significantly reduced the interest
rate bill for the sovereign under programs.
Figure 5 reports ESM calculations of the ‘saving’ on interest costs made possible by the
low spreads charged by euro area official lenders in the period 2011-2016, relative to both
IMF and market financing (see ESM 2017). The figure plots a rough measure of “savings on
the interest bill” in percentage of GDP.7
Figure 5 here
The effects of euro area official loans on interest payment flows are quite significant,
relative to market conditions. Even for Spain, whose program was the smallest in percentage
of GDP relative to other crisis countries, official assistance is estimated to have lowered the
interest bill by a full percentage point of GDP.8 While an order of magnitude smaller, savings
are also non-negligible relative to the IMF lending conditions.9
4 The Model
In this section we describe our model. Building on Conesa and Kehoe (2017), henceforth
CK), we specify an environment with both rollover and fundamental (output) risk where the
country can be in one of three zones, labeled ‘safe’, ‘crisis’ and ‘default’ zone. At low enough
levels of debt, the country is in the ‘safe zone’ where it never defaults, not even if it suffers
a debt rollover crisis and lose market access. For high enough levels of debt, the country
is in the ‘default zone,’ where it defaults for fundamental reasons (a persistent recession),
regardless of the availability of market funding. At intermediate levels of debt, the country
is in a ‘crisis zone,’ where it services its debt if market funding is available, but defaults
7In the Figure 5, “savings” are calculated by comparing each country’s average sovereign market spread
(or IMF rate corresponding to a loan with size and maturity as that of the ESM loan), matching the ESM
maturity profile, with the equivalent ESM funding cost, and applying that difference to the actual loan by
the ESM. Following ESM (2017), a cap of 6.4 percent is applied to the market rate
8We note that Figure 5 does not include savings from the EFSM, GLF and other bilateral official loans.
Given that the conditions of the vehicles were analogous to those applied to the EFSF loans, overall savings
might be significantly larger.
9As Figure 5 does not to include the hedging costs of borrowing on SDR nor different fees the IMF
charges, but it does include the fees charged by the ESM, we see these figures as a lower bound on the
amount of extra savings.
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if funding dries up per effect of a rollover crisis. The domestic government and consumers
have concave utility, since the crisis zone would disappears with linear utility. International
investors are instead risk neutral.
In this framework, we model the possibility that sovereigns obtain financing from interna-
tional bailout agencies, which dictate the terms of the official loans. We specify two types of
bailout agencies: a IMF-like agency which lends short at relatively high (still below market)
rates; and a ESM-like agency which lends long on more generous terms.
In any given period, the state of the economy is given by the vector s = (b, bi, be, a, z−1, ζ).
Here b is the level of government debt owed to international creditors, bi is debt owed to the
IMF, be is debt owed to the ESM; a is an indicator variable recording whether the economy is
in a recession, a = 0, or in normal times, a = 1; z is an indicator variable recording whether
default has occurred in the past z−1 = 0 or has not (yet) occurred z−1 = 1; finally, ζ is a
sunspot coordinating agents’ belief on the possibility of a rollover crisis. As in Conesa and
Kehoe (2017), the country GDP is given by GDP (a, z) = A1−aZ1−zy.
In our analysis, we assume that the economy starts out with a = 1 and z = 1 but
is hit by a recessionary shock in period 0, a = 0. Every period thereafter, the economy
recovers with probability p < 1, and, once recovered, never falls into recession again. For
simplicity, if and when the government chooses to default, the economy stays in default
forever, z = 0. We posit a constant tax rate θ (calibrated to match the data) so that
consumption is c(a, z) = (1 − θ)y(a, z). The government can sell new bonds b′ at the price
q(b′, s) to international investors, or seek a bailout either from the IMF b′i at the price qi, or
from the ESM b′e at price qe. The country’s government takes the official prices qe and qi as
given. In accordance with the data we will set qe ≤ qi, i.e. the ESM lends at more generous
terms. Furthermore, to derive transparent analytical solutions, we will posit that loans by
the IMF-type agency are one-period, while loans by the ESM-type agency have long maturity
(so δ < 1). Denoting government expenditure with g, the government’s budget constraint is
g + z(b+ bi + δbe) = θy(a, z) + q(b
′, s)b′ + qib′i + qe
[
b′e − (1− δ)be
]
As in Cole and Kehoe (2000) and Conesa and Kehoe (2017), rollover risk is modeled as a
sunspot ζ drawn from a uniform distribution on [0, 1]. If ζ > 1 − pi, international creditors
develop beliefs that a rollover crisis may occur, and, for debt levels high enough that a
crisis is self-validating in equilibrium, refuse to lend to the government. The probability pi
determines the probability that a self-fulfilling rollover crisis materializes, for debt levels that
are high enough for a speculative run on debt to induce the government to default.
As regards timing, we adopt the same sequence as in Conesa and Kehoe (2017), save
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for the fact that in our model the sovereigns can appeal to international bailout agencies if
international creditors refuse to lend. In particular, in each period, the time line is as follows.
First, the shocks a and ζ are realized, and given the aggregate state s = (b, bi, be, a, z−1, ζ),
the government chooses how much to borrow from international creditors b′, the IMF b′i, and
the ESM b′e. Second, each of a continuum of measure-one international bankers choose how
much debt B′ to purchase, and the IMF and ESM provide the funds B′i = b
′
i and B
′
e = b
′
e
according to the sovereign’s request but within the constraint of their standard loans. Lastly
the government decides to repay or default z, thereby generating y, c, and g.
Formally, the problem of the government is as follows:
V (s) = maxu(c, g) + βEV (s′)
c = (1− θ)y(a, z)
g + z(b+ bi + rbe) = θy(a, z) + q(b
′, s)b′ + qeb′e + qib
′
i
z = 0 if z−1 = 0
As in CK we assume that, for any feasible (b, bi, be), the following condition holds: ug((1−
θ)Ay, θAy− b− bi − δbe) > ug((1− θ)y, θy− b− bi − δbe). The government has an incentive
to raise debt and “gamble for redemption” during a recession, as the marginal benefit of
government spending is higher in a recession than in normal times. This assumption is
satisfied by standard concave utility functions like log(c+ g − c¯− g¯).
International creditors are risk neutral with discount factor β, so bond prices q(b′, s) are
determined by probability of default next period. There is a continuum of such creditors,
each solving
W (b, b′, s) = max x+ βEW (b′, b′′, s′)
x+ q(b′, s)b′ = w + z(b′, s, q(b′, s))b
x ≥ 0, b ≥ −A
whereas we assume that investors have ‘deep enough pocket’, i.e., x is large enough to rule
out corner solutions, and the condition on A rules out Ponzi schemes. The bailout agencies,
IMF and ESM, solve similar problems, except that the prices qi and qe at which they lend
are exogenously set and while the entire stock of IMF debt comes due in the next period,
only a fraction δ of the ESM debt comes due every period.
Finally, again following Conesa and Kehoe (2017), we consider equilibria with a simple
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Markov structure. In an environment where output and rollover risk can only take on two
values, the three zones (safe, crisis and default) can then be characterized by four debt
thresholds: two above which default occurs in a recession, without market financing b(0)
and with market financing B(0); two in normal times, without market financing b(1) and
with market financing B(1). Since b(0) < B(0) and b(1) < B(1), the intervals between these
thresholds define the crisis zone in normal times and in a recession, respectively. The safe
zone, where there is no default, is for level of debt below b(0) in a recession, and b(1) in
normal times. In the original contribution by Conesa and Kehoe, these thresholds are points
on the real line. In our model, these are three dimensional objects, as they depend on the
composition of debt, i.e. the share of bi and be in total debt. A qualifying feature of our
analysis is indeed that sustainability will be assessed in relation to these four thresholds,
hence conditional on the state of the economy and the investors’ ‘sentiment.’
Finally, as in the CK model, our model also features multiple equilibria. Given our
interest in understanding the effect of official bailouts on sovereign incentives to run up or
run down its debt due to output and rollover risk, we turn to the characterization of the
equilibrium under these two types of risk next.
5 How does official lending address rollover and reces-
sion risks?
To gain analytical insight, in this section we consider a simplified version of the model.
Namely, we let the country to have access to only one official lending instrument, character-
ized by two parameters: maturity δ and price qe. Hence we model bailouts indexing official
loans by δ and qe, with a one-for-one exchange from (short-term) market debt to official
debt. We assume that a government in default suffer a sunk loss in output equal to τ and
recessions are associated by a sunk loss in output equal to a (rather than fractions of output
1−Z and 1−A as in the full model).10 We also assume no minimum consumption spending,
and an initial state with positive outstanding market debt, but zero official debt.
To focus sharply on the different economic forces at work, we will now consider two
separate model environments, one with rollover risk only, the other with output risk only.
As a matter of notation, when appropriate, we will denote (sustainable) debt conditional on
official lending with the superscript ‘l‘, and ‘nl’ for the case of no official lending.
10For analytical tractability, without loss of generality we posit that governments do to abscond with
current period borrowing (the proofs will go through even if they do, but with added complications).
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5.1 Rollover Risk
Absent output risk, the government only problem is to choose the path bringing the country
out of the crisis zone, that is, how fast it should reduce the debt stock to safe levels. The
trade off is between smoother consumption (a longer period in the crisis zone) and better
borrowing costs (from reaching the safe zone earlier). We will see below that official lending
can substantially ameliorate this trade-off, fostering consumption smoothing in the process
of deleveraging from the crisis to the safe zone. Official lending indeed allows the government
to sustain higher consumption along the transition and can (be structured to) ensure an early
exit from the crisis zone. However, to the extent that it ends up raising average debt in the
economy, a bailout regime also reduces long-run consumption, with potential consequences
for sustainability.
When the only source of risk is the possibility of a rollover crisis, the equilibrium in our
model can be characterized in terms of two debt thresholds only: a lower threshold b(1)
beyond which the government defaults conditional on a rollover crisis, i.e., if market funding
becomes unavailable; an upper threshold B(1) conditional beyond which the government
would default even if market funding were available. Note that there is no recession risk,
hence our assessment is conditional on normal times.
5.1.1 Official lending and sustainability with rollover risk
The key question of interest is how the debt threshold responds to the availability of official
financial assistance in the presence of rollover risk. We find it useful to introduce our analysis
by studying the effects of extending the country access to official loans from one period to
two or more periods.
Notation-wise, denote with bnl the limit of sustainable (one-period) debt with no market
financing and no official debt available, while bl(1), bl(2) etc. denote the debt limit when
one-period bailout funding is available for one period only, two periods and so on. To save
on notation and enhance transparency, in this subsection we write debt omitting the state
of the economy, that is, we write bnl instead of bnl(1).
In an economic environment with rollover risk, but no official financial assistance, the
debt threshold delimiting the safe zone solves the following conditions (same as in CK):
u(y − bnl) + β u(y)
1− β =
u(y − τ)
1− β
Consider now the availability of one-period bailout, in the form of short loans B′ at the price
q. The sustainability condition for bl(1)—the debt limit when bailout funding are available
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for one period only—is:
u(y − bl(1) + qB′) + βu(y −B′) + β2 u(y)
1− β =
u(y − τ)
1− β , qu
′(y − bl(1) + qB′) = βu′(y −B′).
where the latter condition defines a mapping B′ = G(bl(1), q) , which essentially ensures that
B′ is chosen optimally to satisfy the government’s Euler equation.
Similarly, for a bailout available for two periods, we can write the sustainability condition
as follows:
u(y − bl(2) + qB′) + βu(y −B′ + qB′′) + β2u(y −B′′) + β3 u(y)
1− β =
u(y − τ)
1− β ,
qu′(y − bl(2) + qB′) = βu′(y −B′ + qB′′), qu′(y −B′ + qB′′) = βu′(y −B′′′)
For the sake of transparency, focus on the case of log preferences and posit q = β, such
that official lending is at the risk free rate. With single period bailout, the optimal policy
function is B′ =
bl(1)
1+β
. So, the sustainability condition simplifies to:
u
(
y − bl(1) +
βbl(1)
1 + β
)
+ βu
(
y − bl(1)
1 + β
)
+ β2
u(y)
1− β =
u(y − τ)
1− β
By concavity, it follows that bl(1) > bnl since
(1 + β)u
(
y − bl(1)
1 + β
)
= u
(
y − bl(1) +
βbl(1)
1 + β
)
+ βu
(
y − bl(1)
1 + β
)
= u(y − bnl) + βu(y)
By the same token, when the bailout is available for two periods, the sustainability condition
becomes
(1 + β + β2)u
(
y − bl(2)
1 + β + β2
)
+ β3
u(y)
1− β =
u(y − τ)
1− β
Again, by concavity, bnl < bl(1) < bl(2). The logic of the argument and the proof extends to
more periods and holds for general preferences.
The sequence of sustainability conditions above illustrates how lengthening the time
horizon over which the official loans are available widens the safe zone, de facto inducing
private sector bail-in. We should stress that, if official lending widens the boundary of the
safe zone as to include the initial debt stock, sustainability is restored without any need for
actual disbursement of official funds. With rollover risk only, it is well known that the mere
availability of official loans creates guarantees that calms market fears and allows countries
to sustain market financing for higher levels of debt.11
11See Corsetti and Dedola (2016) for a detailed analysis of the mechanism by which credible backstops
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A simple example clarifies this point. Let τ = 5, Y = 100, β = 0.95. With log preferences,
in the absence of official lending, sustainable debt is up to bl(1) = 64.15% of GDP. Now let
official lending become available for one period, at the price qe = 0.95, up to 15% of GDP.
The availability of official funds (not subject to rollover risk) for one period at the equilibrium
price raises the threshold to bl(1) = 72.4% of GDP, so any stock of debt between 64.15 and
72.4% of GDP is safe. For any debt level below the latter threshold, private investors know
that, even if they coordinated on not rolling over their credit to the country, access to official
fund would allow the government to (optimally) avoid default. Hence no rollover crisis will
occur in equilibrium. The difference between 72.4 and 64.15% of GDP is the private sector
bail-in generated by the one-period bailout.
When the country debt exceeds the threshold 72.4%, default is possible despite official
financial assistance, and rollover risk is priced by the markets. The mere availability of official
debt is not enough to bail-in market investors. However, as explained above, official loans
still generate significant benefits when they have either longer maturity or lower spreads
than the market.
5.1.2 The debt threshold conditional on a rollover crisis, b(1)
In what follows we will dig deeper on the effects of bailouts on the thresholds, focusing
specifically on their effects on the transition path from the crisis to the safe zone. For the
sake of tractability and analytical transparency, we will develop our arguments imposing
a regime of permanent official lending—in other words, we proceed by assuming that the
country actually uses official loans every period. Official loans thus change the composition
of the country debt in both the short and the long run.
We start once again from the condition defining the debt limit in the absence of any
official financing, rewritten below for convenience:
u(y − bnl(1)) + β u(y)
1− β =
u(y − τ)
1− β (1)
With official lending, parameterized by (qe, δ) and made available to the country in the event
of a crisis, the above condition becomes
u(y − b(1) + qeb′e) + βu(y − δb′e + qe[b′′e − (1− δ)b′e]) + . . . =
u(y − τ)
1− β
To derive an analytical expression for the threshold, we posit b′e = b
′′
e = . . ., as required by
can raise sustainable debt in the context of a model after Calvo (1988).
17
optimality, so that:
b(1) + qeb
′
e = −δb′e + qe[b′e − (1− δ)b′e]
b(1) = b′e[δ(1− qe) + qe]
b′e =
b(1)
[δ(1− qe) + qe]
− b(1) + qeb′e =
[−δ(1− qe)− qe + qe]b(1)
[δ(1− qe) + qe] =
[−δ + qeδ]b(1)
[δ(1− qe) + qe]
Given that the threshold condition implies −b+qeb′e = −τ , we can write b(1) as a function
of price and maturity of official loans, as follows:
b(1) =
δ(1− qe) + qe
δ(1− qe) τ
Note that, as qe ↗ 1, official loans are interest-free and b(1) ↗ ∞, i.e., any level of debt is
sustainable.12 By contrast, if qe ↘ 0 and δ > 0, we have b(1) ↘ τ and δbe ↘ τ . Even if
in the limit official lending does not carry a positive price, it is still affecting the repayment
structure. Instead of repaying debt in full every period, only a fraction needs to be repaid
hence allowing for potentially larger amounts of outstanding debt (to official, not to market
lenders).
In general we have that
db(1)
dqe
=
δ(1− qe) + qeδ
δ2(1− qe)2 > 0
The higher the price (lower the spread) attached to official lending, the higher the level of
sustainable debt absent market funding.
Next consider the maturity parameter δ. As δ ↗ 1, debt has to be repaid in full the
following period, and b(1) ↘ 1
1−qe τ . Note that we still have a positive correlation between
debt and its price qe. By contrast we have that, as δ ↘ 0, b(1) ↗ ∞—as before. This is
quite intuitive: as the fraction that needs to be repaid in each period approaches zero, the
amount that can be borrowed tends to infinity. In general
db(1)
dδ
= − qe
δ2(1− qe)2 < 0
12As qe ↗ 1, future borrowing from the official lenders is exactly equal the the amount coming due each
period, i.e. δb′e = qe[b
′′
e − (1 − δ)b′e]. So, for optimality, we also have −b(1) = qeb′e = b′e which means that
if the government wants to repay b(1) this period, it can simply borrow b(1) from the official lenders at
maturity δ and keep debt levels at b(1) every period henceforth.
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This establishes that longer maturities (lower δ) and lower spreads (higher qe) both serve
to raise the level of debt sustainable without market financing.
5.1.3 The debt threshold conditional on market financing, B(1).
In the absence of official lending, the level of debt that is sustainable when investors are
willing to finance the government Bnl(1) is determined by the following conditions:
max{V 1(Bnl(1)), V 2(Bnl(1)), . . . , V ∞(Bnl(1))} = u(y − τ)
1− β
V T (B) =
1− [β(1− pi)]T
1− β(1− pi) u(g
T ) +
1− [β(1− pi)]T−1
1− β(1− pi)
βpi
1− βu(y − τ)+
+ [β(1− pi)]T−2βu(y − [1− β]bnl(1))
1− β
gTnl = y −
1− β(1− pi)
1− [β(1− pi)]T
(
B − [β(1− pi)]T−1bnl(1)
)
where T denotes the time of exit from the crisis zone, when debt is brought to the safe zone,
and the last equation in the system above is the result of the series of equations given by
gTnl +B0 = y + β(1− pi)B1
gTnl +B1 = y + β(1− pi)B2
. . .
gTnl +BT−2 = y + β(1− pi)BT−1
gTnl +BT−1 = y + βbnl(1)
Now, introduce official lending, and suppose that, in the transition back to the safe zone
from the crisis zone, the country relies exclusively on official loans. The relevant budget
constraints become
gTl +B0 = y + qe,T−1B1
gTl + δB1 = y + qe,T−2[B2 − (1− δ)B1]
. . .
gTl + δBT−2 = y + qe,1[BT−1 − (1− δ)BT−2]
gTl + δBT−1 = y + qe,0[bl(1)− (1− δ)BT−1]
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This results in the the following key equation characterizing gTl[
1 +
qe,T−1
δ + qe,T−2(1− δ) +
ΠT−1t=T−2qe,t
ΠT−2t=T−3δ + qe,2(1− δ)
+ . . .+
ΠT−1t=1 qe,t
ΠT−2t=0 δ + qe,2(1− δ)
]
gTl +B0 =[
1 +
qe,T−1
δ + qe,T−2(1− δ) +
ΠT−1t=T−2qe,t
ΠT−2t=T−3δ + qe,2(1− δ)
+ . . .+
ΠT−1t=1 qe,t
ΠT−2t=0 δ + qe,2(1− δ)
]
y+
ΠT−1t=1 qe,t
ΠT−2t=0 [δ + qe,t(1− δ)]
qe,0bl(1)
Note that in the special case where qe,0 = β, qe,1 = qe,1 = . . . = qe,T−1 = β(1− pi) and δ = 1
we get back the equation that obtains in the absence of official lending. The functional spec-
ification of the value function V T is unchanged save for the gT argument—as by definition
B(1) is the maximum amount that can be sustained with market lending, so the country
still defaults with probability pi. 13
As before, we gain insight on the role of official lending by splitting the analysis into the
case when official loans differ from market loans in maturity only, and in the price only.
First consider official lending with maturity δ < 1, while setting qe,0 = β, qe,1 = qe,1 = . . . =
qe,T−1 = β(1− pi). In this case the equation for gTl specializes to
gTl = y −
1− x
1− xT
[
B − xT−1βbl(1)
]
, x =
β(1− pi)
δ + β(1− pi)(1− δ)
Recall that we are interested by assessing the amount of additional debt B that can be
supported by increasing the maturity of official lending (a lower δ). The key equation
stipulates that B(1) also depends on T since, by making its current debt decision, the
country chooses how long it remains in the crisis zone, i.e.
max{V 1(Bnl(1)), V 2(Bnl(1)), . . . , V ∞(Bnl(1))} = u(y − τ)
1− β
It is certainly possible that dT/dδ 6= 0, i.e., a change in maturity would also affect the optimal
time to exit. However, it is convenient to proceed at first abstracting from any endogenous
change in the time of exit; and then extending our arguments and results to the general case.
Sustainability for a given time of exit from the crisis zone, T .
For the time being, suppose that the optimal time to exit is unaffected by the change in δ.
13In this stylized example, the budget constraint is derived under the implicit assumption that official
lending terms are more generous than market lending.
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Then we can write:
dV T
dδ
=
1− [β(1− pi)]T
1− β(1− pi) u
′(gT )
dgT
dδ︸︷︷︸
< 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
↑ V T as ↓ δ
+ [β(1− pi)]T−2βu
′(y − [1− β]bl(1))
1− β · −(1− β)
dbl(1)
dδ︸ ︷︷ ︸
< 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
↓ V T as ↓ δ
where
dgT
dδ
= − d
1
1+x+x2+...+xT−1
dx︸ ︷︷ ︸
< 0
dx
dδ︸︷︷︸
< 0
B − β d
xT−1
1+x+x2+...+xT−1
dx︸ ︷︷ ︸
< 0
dx
dδ︸︷︷︸
< 0
bl(1)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
↑ consumption for ↓ δ
+ β
xT−1
1 + x+ x2 + . . .+ xT−1
dbl(1)
dδ︸ ︷︷ ︸
< 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
↑ consumption for ↓ δ
There are at least three important results that can be read from these expressions. The first
concerns the effects of maturity on government consumption. Focus on the decomposition on
the right hand side of dg
T
dδ
: the first two terms show that, in the transition, a longer maturity
(dδ < 0) raises consumption by increasing the effective discount rate on the amount to be
repaid—a lower discount factor lowers it in present value terms. The last terms highlights
an additional positive effect of longer loans maturity: it raises the level of debt that the
government can sustain in the long run bl(1). To the extent that the government has less
debt to run down or repay, it can consume more in the transition. However, and this is
key to our argument below, if the steady-state debt (in the safe zone) is higher, long-run
consumption will correspondingly be lower.
Having established that, with longer maturity, government consumption rises in the tran-
sition but falls in the long run, we can then discuss whether the value function V T rises or
falls with the maturity parameter δ. There are two opposing forces at play. The value func-
tion rises with higher transitional government consumption—this is shown in the first term
in the decomposition of dV
T
dδ
. It falls with a lower long-term consumption (associated with a
higher steady-state level of debt in the safe zone bl(1)).
Which of these two forces dominates depends on the probability that market financing
dries up, pi, and the time to exit the crisis zone T . To appreciate these points, note that
the second term in the value function expression disappears, so that the value function
unambiguously rises with longer maturity, both when pi → 1 and β(1 − pi) → 0, and when
T → ∞. In the first case, a rollover crisis and hence the default are almost sure; in the
second case the country stays in the crisis zone indefinitely, as long as market lenders are
willing to lend (so that, again, a crisis will occur almost surely at some point). The value
function goes up because longer maturity allows the government to consume more while in
a crisis.
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We have seen that, conditional on pi → 1 or T →∞, V T (Bl(1)) increases as δ decreases.
We are now ready to discuss our third, and key, result, concerning the level of sustainable
debt. Consider the indifference condition:
max{V 1(Bl(1)), V 2(Bl(1)), . . . , V ∞(Bl(1))} = u(y − τ)
1− β
The key observation is that, while the left hand side of this condition rises, the right hand
side remains unchanged. Since we know that V T (Bl(1)) is decreasing in Bl(1) for all T—for
the equality above to hold. it must be the case that Bl(1) rises as δ falls.
Just as we have shown how debt maturity δ affects Bl(1), we can examine the effect lowering
the spread on (i.e. raising the price of) official debt, qe. As above, we start by writing out
the expressions for both dV
T
dqe
and dg
T
dqe
:
dV T
dqe
=
1− [β(1− pi)]T
1− β(1− pi) u
′(gT )
dgT
dqe︸︷︷︸
> 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
↑ V T as ↑ qe
+ [β(1− pi)]T−2βu
′(y − [1− β]bl(1))
1− β · −(1− β)
dbl(1)
dqe︸ ︷︷ ︸
> 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
↓ V T as ↑ qe
and
dgT
dqe
= − d
1
1+x+x2+...+xT−1
dx︸ ︷︷ ︸
< 0
dx
dqe︸︷︷︸
> 0
B − β d
xT−1
1+x+x2+...+xT−1
dx︸ ︷︷ ︸
< 0
dx
dqe︸︷︷︸
> 0
bl(1)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
↑ consumption for ↑ qe
+ β
xT−1
1 + x+ x2 + . . .+ xT−1
dbl(1)
dqe︸ ︷︷ ︸
> 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
↑ consumption for ↑ qe
The impact of the higher price on government consumption and the value function can be ap-
preciated following the same steps as for loan maturity. Namely, we first observe that a higher
debt price increases both the discount rate and the debt limit absent market funding—both
serve to increase government consumption in the transition. Higher transitional government
consumption gT in turn raises the value function for a given level of Bl(1). This positive
effect is however countered by the higher steady state level of bl(1), which lowers the value
function. With pi → 1 or T → ∞, the second force vanishes and V T (Bl(1)) increases with
higher qe. Given that the optimal time to exit remains unchanged, this in turn implies that
Bl(1) rises with higher qe.
Endogenous exit time, T .
The argument so far abstracts from the effect of varying the terms of the official loans on the
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time of exit from the crisis zone. We now complete our argument by examining the general
case, discussing how the optimal time to exit T changes with a (sufficiently large) fall in
δ. To do so, observe that dV
T
dδ
< 0 as T → ∞, since the steady-state term disappears, and
dV T
dδ
> 0 as T → 0, since the transitional term disappears. Thinking of T as a continuous
variable and using the fact that dV
T
dδ
is continuous and decreasing in T, we have that ∃T ∗
s.t. dV
T
dδ
> 0 for all T < T ∗ and dV
T
dδ
≤ 0 for all T ≤ T ∗. Suppose T1 solves
V T1(Bnl(1)) = max{V 1(Bnl(1)), V 2(Bnl(1)), . . . , V ∞(Bnl(1))} = u(y − τ)
1− β
so that T1 is the optimal time to exit absent official lending, with market debt indexed by
maturity paramter δ1 = 1. Define T2 to be the optimal time to exit when there is official
lending characterized by maturity parameter δ2 < 1 and qe. Suppose T1 ≤ T ∗ − 1. Then
we know that, as maturity lengthens and δ2 ↘ 0, we have dV Tdδ > 0 for all T ≤ T1 and
dV T
dδ
≤ 0 for all T > T ∗. So for a sufficiently large drop in δ2 it is possible that the optimal
time to exit switches to T2 > T1. If this is the case, denote by Bl(1) = BT2(δ2) the level
of sustainable debt with both official lending and time to exit T2, with BT1(δ2) the level of
sustainable debt with both official lending and time to exit T1, and with Bnl(1) = BT1(δ1)
the level of sustainable debt with no official lending and time to exit T1. We then have
that Bl(1) = BT2(δ2) > BT1(δ2) > BT1(δ1) = Bnl(1), where the first inequality follows
from the value function being decreasing in debt and T2 being the optimal time to exit (so
V T2(δ2) > V
T1(δ2));
14 and the second inequality follows from the earlier observation that
the level sustainable rises with longer maturity provided pi or T is sufficiently large. As the
change in maturity transpires into a lengthening of the time spent in the crisis zone, this
only serves to increase the equilibrium value function (and hence the level of sustainable
debt)—since the utility gains from higher government consumption while in the crisis zone
outweigh the losses in the safe zone.
A comment is in order concerning the asymmetric effect of official lending on the govern-
ment’s choice sets in the presence of rollover risk. In particular, official lending introduces
an asset that raises utility in a rollover crisis, but not necessarily so with market lending.
In some cases, official lending narrows the ‘crisis zone’ both from below (higher level of safe
debt) and above (a lower level of initial debt that can be sustained even absent rollover
crisis). Namely, we know that for sufficiently low T , an increase in the safe zone (a higher
b(1)) only serves to lower the value function (as official lending has limited or no impact
on the discount factor).15 This in turn results in a drop of the upper threshold B(1), and
14The result follows from equating these values with the value of default.
15Recall our earlier observation, that a credible regime of financial assistance widens the safe zone inde-
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thus a smaller crisis zone B(1)− b(1). Official lending can actually eliminate the crisis zone
altogether, for sufficiently high qe and low δ—as shown earlier, b(1)→∞. But to the extent
that a longer maturity of official loans transpires into a delay in exit, a key conclusion of our
analysis is that they will raise the country’s welfare—essentially by improving consumption
smoothing in the transition.
5.2 Output Risk
In a model environment with fundamental output risk, the two relevant thresholds define
the maximum level of sustainable debt in a recession and in normal times, denoted by,
respectively, B(0) and B(1).
5.2.1 The debt threshold in normal times, B(1).
To analyze this threshold, it is convenient to start considering two extreme lending cases,
one in which the government borrows short term, the other—long term. Without official
financing, if the government borrows short term only, the condition defining Bnl(1) takes the
form:
u(y − [1− β]Bnl(1))
1− β =
u(y − τ)
1− β ⇒ Bnl(1) =
τ
1− β .
Denote with B1 the debt threshold when the country borrows long term. With the country
issuing bonds with maturity δ < 1 and sold at risk-neutral prices, this threshold satisfies:
u(y − δB1 + q[B1 − (1− δ)B1])
1− β =
u(y − τ)
1− β ,
where
q =
βδ
1− β(1− δ) ⇒ B1 =
τ
δ(1− q)
It is easy to verify that that B1 > Bnl(1), since
δ(1− q) = δ(1− β)
1− β(1− δ) <
[1− β(1− δ)](1− β)
1− β(1− δ) = 1− β
We can in fact decompose the ratio B/Bnl(1) > 1 into a maturity and price components:
B1
Bnl(1)
=
1
δ︸︷︷︸
maturity effect > 1
· 1− β
1− q︸ ︷︷ ︸
price effect > 1
pendently of effective disbursement of funds.
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The maturity effect is intuitive. Suppose that with one period debt (all debt had to be repaid
in each period), the maximum sustainable level is 100. If only a quarter has to be repaid in
each period, a given cash flow can sustain 400. The price effect is subtler, in that it relies
on discounting. Essentially, the difference between β and q lies in the fact that q splits the
bond return over time so that with future proceeds discounting, q < β. To wit: if there was
no discounting and β = 1, we would have q = β = 1 and there would be no price effect. The
mechanism works in the following way: for any given level of debt issuance, a lower price for
debt allows the government to consume more (and hence have a higher value function when
it repays); so, to make the government indifferent between repaying and defaulting, it must
be allowed to borrow more.
When we introduce official lending (once again, assuming that official debt is chosen in
perpetuity), the relevant condition for the threshold becomes:
u(y−Bl(1)+qeBe)+βu(y−δBe+qe[B′e−(1−δ)Be])+β2
u(y − δB′e + qe[B′e − (1− δ)B′e])
1− β =
u(y − τ)
1− β
We are interested in understanding the implications of a portfolio change, from market to
official debt. Assuming qe ∈ (q, β)), we can think of the effects of this change essentially as
a convex combination of two cases analyzed above: one has only Short Term (ST) lending
and price β, the other Long-Term (LT) lending and price q. In other words, we will have
Bnl(1) < Bl(1) ≤ B1.16
5.2.2 The debt threshold in recessions, B(0).
The last threshold is for the case of an economy currently in a recession, with output equal
to y − a, with a probability of recovery equal to p. Absent official lending, the indifference
condition is given by
u(y −Bnl(0)− a+ βpBnl(1)) + βpu(y − [1− β]Bnl(1))
1− β + β(1− p)
u(y − τ − a)
1− β =
u(y − τ − a) + βpu(y − τ)
1− β + β(1− p)
u(y − τ − a)
1− β
16Setting Be = B
′
e = B1, and letting qe = q we obtain Bl(1) = [q+ δ(1− q)]B1 = δ1−β(1−δ)B1 < B1. Now
imagine that qe = q = 0. In this case we have Bq=0 = (1 − q)B1 and Bl,q=0(1) = δBq=0 = δ(1 − q)B1 =
δ(1−β)
1−β(1−δ)B1 < Bl(1). In fact, Bl,q=0(1)/Bl(1) = (1 − β). On the other hand, consider the case where
qe = q = 1. In this case, we have Bl,q=1(1) → ∞ and any level of debt is sustainable as one simply has to
borrow the same amount every period ad infinitum.
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We know from the discussion above that Bnl(1) =
τ
1−β . Hence we have
Bnl(0) + a− βpBnl(1) = τ + a⇒ Bnl(0) = τ + βp τ
1− β =
τ(1− β + βp)
1− β < Bnl(1)
It is useful to clarify from the start that default risk in future recession is what drives the
thresholds Bnl(0) and Bnl(1) apart. To see this most clearly, take the ratio of the two:
Bnl(0)
Bnl(1)
= 1− β + βp
Under our assumption, once in a recession, the economy only recovers with finite probability
p and thus remains exposed to risk of default. The debt price at which investors are willing
to lend is therefore βp and not β, as it would be if the economy were expected to recover
for sure. Indeed, as p ↗ 1, debt becomes less risky and the two thresholds converge—they
actually coincide in the limiting case in which the probability of remaining in a recession
(hence default risk) vanishes.
As above, consider the case in which the government borrows long term, by issuing bonds
with maturity δ at the price q. We have
u(y − δB0 − a+ q0[B1 − (1− δ)B0]) + βpu(y − δB1 + q[B1 − (1− δ)B1])
1− β + β(1− p)
u(y − τ − a)
1− β =
u(y − τ − a) + βpu(y − τ)
1− β + β(1− p)
u(y − τ − a)
1− β .
where from risk-neutral pricing and the previous analysis we know that
q0 =
βpδ
1− βp(1− δ) , B1 =
τ
δ(1− q) , q =
βδ
1− β(1− δ)
After some algebraic manipulation, we obtain the following expression for B0
δB0 − q0B1 + q0(1− δ)B0 = τ ⇒ B0 = τ + q0B1
δ + q0(1− δ) ⇒ B0 =
1− β + βpδ
δ(1− β) τ
Taking once again the ratio between the two thresholds (for the safe and crisis zone), we
obtain:
B0
B1
=
1− β + βpδ
1− β + βδ .
This ratio is also converging to 1 as p ↗ 1. However, the overall effect is now tempered by
the fact that only a fraction δ of debt is repaid every period.
In order to fully appreciate why the threshold B0 is different from Bnl(0), we find it useful
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to decompose the ratio between the two as follows:
B0
Bnl(0)
=
B0
B1︸︷︷︸
default·maturity effect
· B1
Bnl(1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
pure maturity+price effect
· Bnl(1)
Bnl(0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
pure default price effect
=
1− β + βpδ
δ(1− β + βp) > 1
The first component is what we have just discussed: it tells us that the two thresholds
are different because the price effect induced by default differs when interacted with longer
maturity debt. The second component reflects our earlier discussion, for the case of no
recessions and hence no default. In this case, long-term debt has both maturity and price
effects. The third component is a pure ‘default price effect’, that account for the change
in the sustainable level of debt brought about by the mere possibility of default in future
recessions, with no interaction with debt maturity (see the beginning of this subsection). Of
these three components, only the first one is smaller than one. In aggregate, the ratio is
greater than 1.
We are now ready to assess the effects of a change in the composition of debt, from
market to official lenders. The indifference condition for this case is:17
u(y −Bl(0)− a+ qe,0[B1 − (1− δ)Bl(0)]) + βpu(y − δB1 + qe[B1 − (1− δ)B1])
1− β
+ β(1− p)u(y − τ − a)
1− β = u(y − τ − a) + βp
u(y − τ)
1− β + β(1− p)
u(y − τ − a)
1− β
Setting qe = q and qe,0 = q0, this yields the threshold
Bl(0) =
τ + q0B
1 + q0(1− δ) <
τ + q0B
δ + q0(1− δ) = B0
where the inequality is strict because market debt is short-term—less debt Bl(0) is sustain-
able relative to the case where the original debt was already long-term, B0.
18
17Observe that the debt policy adopted in the indifference condition is one where the government chooses
B1 and not Bl(1); it might seem more natural to pick Bl(1) but Bl(1) would not be appropriate as it entails
another portfolio shift while the official lending terms are already LT, hence the optimal choice being B1
instead.
18Now consider what happens when qe,0 = 0. In this case we get Bl,qe,0=0 = τ < B0. The converse is
true if we set qe,0 = 1. In this case, we obtain Bl,qe,0=1 =
τ+B1
2−δ → ∞ as B1 → ∞. One key assumption
underlying this result is the availability of official lending at all times: this result of infinitely sustainable
debt goes away once this assumption is relaxed and official lending is stopped at some point, as then it is
impossible to refinance debt every period in perpetuity the way it is done here.
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5.3 Discussion
The analytical characterization presented so far is meant to illustrate the forces at work in a
simple environment. Three comments are in order concerning our simplifying assumptions.
First, for tractability, we have focused on the case in which bailout loans are available at
all times and for an infinite number of periods. Not all our results can be expected to go
through if this is not the case—i.e., if the availability of bailout funds is on a temporary
basis. As official loans affect exit times and repayment/default decisions, it is possible that
bailouts over finite horizons can paradoxically have adverse effects on sustainability. In
particular, to the extent that a few years with official lending induce countries to service
debt in a persistent recession, the eventual withdrawal of support may actually result in a
lower threshold for the initial stock of debt that the country is willing to sustain—relative
to the case where the default and repayment states are unaffected by the bailout terms.
Second, to ease exposition, we have assumed that the right-hand side of the indifference
conditions are unchanged following the introduction of the bailout. This need not be the
case: a country may default on official loans, implying that its utility in default could well
be a function of the funds obtained from official lenders.
Finally, while we have analyzed rollover and output risk separately, they have significant
interactions in the model (as well as in the data). Similarly, while we have considered only
one type of bailouts, debt dynamics can potentially be very different if various types of
official debt are used in conjunction with market lending. We will allow for this possibility
in the quantitative analysis to follow.
6 Quantitative Analysis
In this section, we use the model in its full specification described at the beginning of Section
4 for a quantitative exercise focusing on the case of Portugal in July 2011—preferring it over
Ireland, who did not face a recession but a banking crisis, and over Greece, as Portugal did
not restructure its debt the way Greece did.19 We then use the model to carry out some
counterfactual exercises, to gain insight on the sensitivity of our results to key features of
official lending—maturity and price.20
Calibration
We show the list of parameters and targets in Table 2. We normalize output Y to 100 so
19The Appendix contains a brief summary of the Portuguese program.
20In Corsetti et al. (2017) we study the effect of the terms of the official loans on Ireland’s market access
conditions, and find results in line with the ones here.
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that the units in our model can be interpreted as percentage of GDP: e.g. B = 120 means
debt that is 120% of GDP. We set the default cost at 5%, consistent with Cole and Kehoe
(1996). Our default cost is lower relative to the literature (e.g. Mendoza and Yue (2012)),
on the grounds that we assume this cost to be permanent—while others assume this to be
temporary. We set the probability of recovery p equal to 0.33, in line with evidence of recovery
in Portugal (and other euro area countries that received official support) where the economy
bounced back after 3 years. Similarly, we set the fraction of output lost in a recession in line
with the realized output drop in the 2011 recession, equal to seven percent. The target for
the level of ‘essential’ government expenditure is average government consumption (21% of
GDP). The presence of this non-homothetic term allows us to have a discount factor closer
to standard business cycle or growth models than in standard quantitative sovereign default
models (where the discount factor can be as low as 0.8; see also Bocola and Dovis 2015).
To match model with data, the probability of a market frenzy pi is calibrated in conjunction
with the discount factor and the probability of recovery to target the spread in Portuguese
bonds in July 2011. Government revenue as a fraction of output is used to parameterize the
tax variable θ. We follow Conesa and Kehoe (2017) in setting the relative weight of c and g
in the utility function equal to 0.5; sensitivity analysis shows that this particular parameter
is unimportant for our results.
The parameters discussed thus far are relatively standard and found in other models
in this literature; we depart from the literature by introducing two types of official debt
instruments into the government’s decision problem. In accordance with their empirical
counterparts, these two instruments have different maturities and spreads. To capture debt
maturity in a parsimonious way, we model long-term debt in the same way as most models
in this literature (Chatterjee and Eyigungor, 2012; Hatchondo and Martinez, 2009) where
the borrowing country repays a fraction δ of debt each period, and old and new debt are
treated alike. Given this assumption, ESM debt is parameterized to reflect initial lending
conditions to Portugal: 15 years maturity and no spread over the Bund rate and likewise
for IMF debt (7 years maturity and a spread of 300 bps over the SDR rate). The market
spread is endogenously determined; its maturity is set to 6 years, consistent with the average
maturity of Portuguese debt.21
The Portugal case study
In our calibration, the model economy is initially well within the crisis zone, conditional
21We note that our stylized specification of maturity captures the key difference between IMF- and
ESM-style lending, but falls short of accounting for the specific management of repayment flows that ESM
programs feature in reality.
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on the level of debt and recessionary state of the economy. The country can only issues
market debt at the high spread implied by both rollover and output uncertainty; as the cost
of borrowing from the market is prohibitive, it then chooses to borrow from the IMF and
ESM instead.
We find that, with the parameterization of Table 2, our model is able to replicate both
the initial state of the Portuguese economy and the dynamic evolution of debt and spreads
following the access to euro area official lending. In particular, as debt to the IMF and
ESM accumulates in the model as it does in the data, consistent with empirical evidence,
market spreads fall after the economy recovers in the model—holding constant the sequence
of shocks to output and for given market financing. Remarkably, in the model, total debt
as a fraction of output is upward sloping, but only mildly so. In this dimension, the model
is quantitatively less effective: the total-debt-to-GDP ratio rises by more than 20% in the
data. In other words, while our model and parameterization replicate the shifts in debt
composition towards official loans, the substitution into (cheaper) official debt and away from
market debt hinders the model’s ability to replicate the overall rising trajectory observed in
the data (where market debt stays almost flat even as official debt rises).
It is worth reiterating, nonetheless, that the model is able to capture most of the change
in dynamics of official debt, the associated evolution of spreads (especially the endogenous
response of market spreads), as well as the Portugal’s transition from the ‘crisis’ to the
‘safe’ zone. This is remarkable: all these are generated endogenously and not targeted in
the calibration. If anything, the model achieves too much, in that our calibration does not
factor in key policy initiatives that, especially after 2012, weighed on spreads—such as the
introduction of the Outright Monetary Transaction program by the ECB.
Counterfactuals
We now use the model as a lab to shed light on how the terms of official lending may
affect debt sustainability. In particularly, theory suggests that we can think of sustainability
in terms of four debt limits or thresholds—separating a safe from a crisis zone for debt,
conditional on the economy being in a recession or in normal time. To gain insight on
sustainability, we can evaluate quantitatively how these four limits respond to changing the
terms of official assistance in three dimensions: size, price and maturity.
We report our results in Figure 6 through 10. Each figure includes 4 panels, one for each
debt limit. Each panel shows 16 histograms, that we present as static representations of
the full dynamic model. Debt thresholds can be read on the y-axis, corresponding to the
height of each histogram. The color pattern of the histogram represents the composition
of borrowing. This changes from market only (the first block to the left of each figure) to
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markets plus official lending—allowing the IMF- and ESM-type loans to increase in steps,
each with size 5% of GDP. To be clear: Block 1 is the no-assistance case. Block 2 through 4
shows that happens to the debt limit when the model economy receives IMF-type assistances
in tickets of 5, 10 or 15% of GDP. In block 4 through 8, we consider the effect of an official
loan with ESM characteristics equal to 5% of GDP—first on its own, then added to the
sequence of tickets from the IMF. In blocks 9 through 12, we repeat the same experiment
with ESM loans up to 10% of GDP. Blocks 13 through 16 repeat the same with an ESM
ticket up to 15% of GDP.
Consider Figure 6 first, referring to our benchmark calibration. Focus on b(0), on the
upper left-hand side of the figure. This threshold measures how much debt the country finds
it optimal to sustain free of default risk when the economy is in a recession and suffers a
market rollover crisis. A key result suggested by the panel is clearly in line with our analytical
result—that the size of the safe zone, where there is no vulnerability to either rollover or
fundamental risk, is increasing in official assistance. Our quantitative analysis confirms that
this goes true whether assistance comes in the form of either IMF or ESM loans, or both.
Quantitatively, the first panel suggests that, in a recession, the economy could only sustain
about 80% GDP of debt, had it to rely exclusively on borrowing from the market. But
sustainable debt can go up to 90% when the country hold a portfolio of ESM and IMF loans,
each measuring up to 15% of GDP. Again, this is consistent with our theory where official
debt unambiguously raises the level that is sustainable without market financing.
Comparing the two graphs in the first line further suggests that the effect is similar for
b(1)—the debt limit when the economy is not in a recession. This limit is higher than b(0),
but is also monotonically rising in assistance—even more than b(0).
The picture is however quite different, and much richer, for B(0) and B(1), the debt
limit in a recession or in normal times, respectively, beyond which debt is not sustainable
for fundamental reasons (the government would default whether or not subject to a rollover
crisis). Consider the case in which the country has access to market financing while in a
recession B(0). Here, a moderate amount of official loans is good—as it can raise debt levels
from 175% to 180%. But higher levels of official debt turn out to be counterproductive, in
the sense that it ends up decreasing the total amount of sustainable debt. This is consistent
with the theory as well: we have shown that, to the extent that a wider safe zone translate
into an increase in long-term steady state debt (shown in the first panel) lowers consumption
in the future; this raises the incentives to default, hence lowers the amount of sustainable
debt. Similar conclusions can be drawn looking at the panel for B(1).
There are four key variables underlying our benchmark result: ESM debt maturity, ESM
lending rate, IMF debt maturity, and IMF lending rate. To examine the role of each of these
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variables separately, we run four counterfactuals: a counterfactual where both the ESM and
IMF lend at the ESM rate, keeping everything else constant; a counterfactual where both
ESM and IMF lend at the same maturity, ceteris paribus; and two counterfactual switching
maturity and rates across lending institutions.
The results for these counterfactuals are shown in Figures 7 through 10, using the same
format as Figure 6. First consider Figure 7, which illustrates the effects of these four types
of policies on the level of sustainable debt for a country in a recession with no access to
market financing—the b(0) threshold. The panel on the top left is the result of having both
the IMF and ESM lend at the same maturity as ESM debt (15 years), the panel on the top
right has both institutions lending at the maturity of IMF debt (7 years), the bottom left is
when both ESM and IMF lend at the ESM rate (150 bps above risk free), and the bottom
right is when both institutions adopt the IMF rate (350 bps over risk free) ceteris paribus.
A key result from this figure is that debt maturity has a stronger impact on the threshold
than spreads: holding constant debt composition, one can see that sustainability is highest
in the case when both lending institutions structure their bailouts with ESM maturity, and
are lowest when both bailouts have IMF maturity. The cases in which maturities are as in
the data but spreads are set as in IMF and ESM loans lie within these two extremes.
The result that debt maturity has a stronger effect on thresholds than spread (consistent
with our analytical derivation) is confirmed in the other counterfactuals. These however
also lend quantitative support to another key theoretical prediction. Namely, debt limits
are increasing in official debt conditional on no market financing, but not necessarily so
conditional on market financing. In particular, Figures 9 and 10 illustrate our finding, that
the debt limits with financing at first increase with more official debt, but eventually drop.
They actually drop to levels even lower than conditional on no official debt at all.
Key to this result is the fact that the the upper limit with market financing is a function of
the lower limit without market financing—this is so, because a higher lower limit also raises
the average (steady state) level of debt that the government finds it optimal to pursue. As we
have seen in our analytical section, a rise in the stock of steady-state debt translates into lower
long-run consumption. This effect may more than offset any gains from a rise in consumption
in the transition from the crisis to the safe zone, reducing the overall value function for any
given initial level of debt. To the extent that the value of default is unaffected by these
changes—as it is in our model specification—the level of initial debt that is sustainable must
fall to bring the value function back in line with the value of default.
This is indeed a key message of our paper: depending on how official debt is structured,
the stock of debt that is sustainable with official ending can be higher than or lower than
the amount that is sustainable without official lending—the way in which public support is
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structured and made available to country matters significantly. In our exercises, sustainable
debt ranges from low (80% GDP) to very high (180% GDP) levels, depending on both
the state of the economy (output and market access) and the availability, size spreads and
maturities (debt composition) of official loans. These effects can be moderated by modeling
(political) uncertainty in the access to official lenders, something that we abstract from but
would be straightforward to model.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we have explored the extent to (and modalities with) which the terms of
official lending affect debt sustainability, by impinging on the behavior of both governments
and investors. Official support modifies the incentives for a country to borrow, repay, and
eventually reduce its debt to a sufficiently low level that its bonds are issued at default-
risk free prices. Using our model, we have explored the mechanisms by which official loans
may raise the debt limit for issuing safe bonds, improve risk-sharing in period of market
turbulences and recessions—gaining insight into various countervailing forces that official
lenders may want to consider when designing a bailout package. If the official lending is
structured as to induce higher levels of steady state debt, or repayment in states of the
world where the economy has been subject to a sufficiently long sequence of negative output
shocks, the threshold for sustainable debt can actually fall.
Far from being a theoretical construct, we take our model to the data and show that
it can replicate the debt and spread dynamics in the recent debt crisis in Portugal (2011-
2015). Consistent with our theory, we find in the quantitative analysis that official debt is a
crucial component in spurring the recovery of the Portuguese economy and lowering market
spreads. And, while both quantitatively significant, we find that longer maturities are more
important to raising sustainability than lower spreads. We find that different terms of official
lending give rise to significantly different thresholds for sustainable debt—quantitatively, we
find that, per effect of the bailout, the safe debt threshold varies between 80 and about 100%
of GDP for Portugal; the default threshold varies between about 150 to over 180% of GDP.
While political uncertainty about the access to the program could moderate the effects of
the bailout, the implications are bound to remain significant.
Among directions for future research, an important one concerns the problem official
lenders solves when offering bailouts—raising issues in its objective function (possibly re-
flecting welfare relevant distortions and spillovers from a country default) and relevant con-
straints. Also, the analysis in this paper abstracts from possible adverse consequences of a
bailout on the government incentives to undertake costly but beneficial reforms or policies.
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As is well understood, these incentives may respond differently to bailouts addressing self-
fulfilling risk as opposed to fundamental risk. Our framework could be developed to gain
insight on policy trade-offs when they two risks cannot be completely separated, and interact
significantly before and during crises.
Appendix: Official lending to Portugal
Portugal entered a program in April 2011. The financing of its 78 bill program fell on equal
parts on the EFSM, EFSF and IMF. The maturity was initially set equal to 7.5 years, as
in Ireland. The margin was however lower, about 210 bps. The decision to charge a lower
spread might have reflected the fact that, by that time, the ongoing Greek and Irish pro-
grams were performing below expectations. Portugal signed a 26 billion euros EFF program
with the IMF, with a maturity of seven years.
The program relied on the timely implementation of structural reforms. It was soon
apparent that these reforms could not be expected to materialize over the relevant horizon. In
reaction, the EFSF and the EFSM granted to the Portuguese government conditions similar
to those offered Ireland in late 2010. In particular, in July 2011, the euro area authorities
decided to eliminate the margin on both EFSM and EFSF loans, and extend their maturity
to a maximum of 15 years.22 In order to grant identical conditions in Portugal and Ireland,
a final change in the terms of the EFSF and EFSM programs occurred in April 2013. On
that date, authorities decided that EFSF and EFSM loan maturities would be extended by
7 and half years, to 22 years.
22As the initial EFSF loan to Portugal featured a lower margin, the June 2011 margin cut was 50 bps
larger for Ireland than for Portugal.
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Tables and Figures
Table 1: IMF versus ESM Lending Terms
Maturity Interest rate Maturity Interest rate
Greece 30 years 1.07 8 years 4.06
Ireland 22 years 2.45 7 years 3.07
Portugal 22 years 2.25 7 years 3.07
Spain 12.5 years 0.5 - -
Cyprus 15 years 0.87 4 years 1.07
EFSF/ESM Support IMF Support
Sources: International Monetary Fund, European Commission, European Financial Stability 
Facility and European Stability Mechanism. Interest rates are computed as of June 2013.
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Table 2: Calibration
Y Output 100
Zd Default cost 0.95
A Fraction of output during recession 0.93
β Discount factor 0.98
pi Real interest rate in crisis 7%
θ Goverment revenue as a share of output 0.4
g Level of essential government expenditure 25
γ Relative weight of c and g in the utility function 0.5
p Probability of leaving the recession 0.33
δ Amortization of market borrowing 0.1667
δi Amortization of IMF loan 0.1429
qi Interest on the IMF loan 0.9483
δe Amortization of ESM loan 0.067
qe Interest on the ESM loan 0.9662
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Figure 1: Market Spreads and Sovereigns’ Creditor Structure
Sources: European Commission, European Stability Mechanism, Central Banks and Bloomberg. Debt is measured as percentage of GDP. The market rate, measured on 
the right hand side axis, refers to the spread on the benchmark 10 year sovereign bond. ESM debt refers to any debt issued by any of the various European vehicles 
(Greek Loan Facility, EFSF, EFSM, ESM) and to bilateral loans provided by European Governments.
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Figure 2: Interest Rates on Market and Official Financing
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Figure 3: Repayment Profiles: IMF versus Euro-area Institutions
Sources: European Commission, European Stability Mechanism and International Monetary Fund. Debt repyaments measured in billion euros.
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Figure 4: Roll-over needs and Official Lending
CY
CY
CY CY
CY
ES
ESESES
GR
GR
GR GRGR
PT
PT
PT
PT
PT
0
10
20
30
40
D
eb
t s
er
vi
ce
 n
ee
ds
 a
s 
%
 o
f p
ub
lic
 d
eb
t
0 .2 .4 .6
Euro area official financing as % of public debt
Figure 5: ESM vs. Market/IMF - Interest savings (as percentage of 2016 GDP)
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Figure 6: Benchmark
Figure 7: Safe zone threshold in a recession and no market financing b(0)
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Figure 8: Safe zone threshold in normal time but no market financing b(1)
Figure 9: Upper crisis zone threshold in a recession B(0)
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Figure 10: Upper crisis zone threshold in normal times B(1)
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